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KENTucxy LAW JouRNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-PRICE FIXING
BY THE STATE
Ordinary citizens might wonder how, under a free enterprise system of economics such as exists in the United States, a state could
legally regulate the prices charged by a private business. Be that as it
may, price fixing by the states dates back to about 1870, although there
were occasional cases appearing earlier,' and in recent years it has
gained force in every state in the union.
The fixing of prices by the states began with attempts to regulate
the prices charged by public utilities such as gas, electric, and water
and transportation businesses. As the years passed more types of businesses have come within the scope of price fixing and as the realm has
been enlarged, the basis of the state's power has undergone a change.
Originally it was considered that the public utilities were so affected
with a public interest, and so vitally connected with community life,
that the states had power to regulate prices as a necessary part of the
general power to regulate for the public interest. But with the
widening of the realm of price fixing to additional businesses, the
theory has arisen that the state's power to fix prices of businesses,
public or private, is based on the police power of the state.
This paper will treat only briefly the question of the regulation of
public utilities as such, and the main body of the paper will be devoted
to a study of whether the police power of a state can extend so far as
to permit state regulation of private businesses and the prices charged
by these businesses.
Under modem conditions, the life of the community has become
largely dependent upon the utilities. Because of non-competitive conditions under which most utilities operate, the user must be protected
from too high rates and from unfair discrimination. Also, it is in the
public interest that the companies be allowed a reasonable amount or
margin of profit so as to assure that satisfactory service will be maintained, improved and expanded.
It is difficult to find a satisfactory legal definition of "public utility"
because the meaning of the term is constantly changing. It has come
to be recognized that the rendering of certain services which are indispensable to the general public definitely affects the public. To businesses of this character, the state grants special privileges denied to
private businesses, and protects them in the enjoyment of these special
privileges. Correspondingly, the state regulates these businesses so as
IYuille
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to protect the public from any possible abuses. Because the law has
recognized that the public has an interest in such businesses, they
have come to be known as "public utilities." To use the terminology
used by some courts, private property used as a public utility ceases
to be purely private property because when so used it becomes "affected with a public interest."2
As has been said, the original basis for state regulation of private
business was on the theory that the state had the inherent power to
regulate those businesses which were affected with a public interest.
This theory is supported by the earlier cases and at least one prominent
authority on Constitutional Law,3 although the current view seems to
rest the power on the police power of the state.
Willoughby, in his work on Constitutional Law, says that states
have constitutional authority to regulate prices charged and the
services rendered by public utilities and businesses affected with a
public interest.4 This power is closely related to, but definitely distinct from the state's police power. He says that while such businesses
are subject to the same police power that private businesses are, they
are also, because of what Willoughby calls their essential nature, subject to further regulation.
Willoughby then distinguishes the police power of the state and
the right to regulate public utilities by saying:
The power that is recognized to be possessed by the State for the
regulation of industries of a public character, or industries affected
with a public interest, is deduced from the peculiar public, or partly

public character, of the industries regulated. The field open for legal
regulation is thus a comparatively limited one even though its boun-

daries are somewhat indefinite. The right of control exercisable under
the police power is, however, coextensive with the social and eco-

nomic activities of men, and finds its limits not in the public or quasipublic character of the industries affected, but in the nature of the

acts forbidden or required, and founds its jurisdiction upon the direct
relation of these acts to the public welfare. 5
This conception of the power to regulate "businesses affected with
the public interest" was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1876 in the
first important case involving the state regulation of such a business.
This case was Munn v. Illinois,6 concerning the validity of a state
statute regulating the rates charged by grain elevators. The Supreme
Court said, while holding such regulation constitutional, that:
2See McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected With a Public Interest. 43
HAnv. L. REv. 759 (1930).
3 WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

752 (2d Ed. 1930).
6 Id. at 767.

Idem.
6 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may
withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control3

The purpose of this paper is to examine the power to regulate the
prices charged by private businesses under the exercise of the police
power. The case of Munn v. Illinois,8 and cases following it, represented a transition through which the Courts have gradually changed

from the public utility theory to the police power theory as the underlying basis for state regulation of the prices charged by private businesses.

The first case that endorsed the police power of the state in
regulating the prices of private businesses was Nebbia v. New York,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1934. 9 This case involved the constitutionality of a New York statute defining the prices that could be
charged for milk in retail stores. In holding the statute valid the court
said:
The phrase 'affected with a public interest,' can, in the nature of
things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is
subject to control for the public good.' 0
Later, in the same opinion, the court said:
In several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions
'affected with a public interest' and 'clothed with a public use,' have
been brought forward as the criteria of the validity of price control,
it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition and
form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation directed at business practices or prices. These decisions must rest,
finally, upon the basis that the requirements of due process were not
met because the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and
effect. But there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by
appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any of its
aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells."1

This language used by the Supreme Court would seem to indicate
an abandonment the public interest theory and a shift to the police
power as a basis of price regulation by the state. This is the view
taken by Rottschaefer in his book on Constitutional Law, who says:
The opinion in the Nebbia case rejected the theory that legislative
price fixing and price regulation were limited to 'businesses affected
with a public interest' in the sense of that phrase as developed in the
7 Id. 94 U.S. at 126.

8 Ibid.
l-OId. 291 U.S. at 536.

9 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
11 Ibid.
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earlier decisions, held that that phrase meant no more than that the
business so described was, for adequate reasons, subject to control
for the public good, and made the test of liability of any business to
governmental price control depend on whether it could be justified by
principles applicable in determining the validity of any other form of
exercise of a 12state's police power or the federal government's regulatory power.

Rottschaefer goes on to say that the earlier theory is still being
used by some courts, citing a Supreme Court case which arose in
Georgia and held that tobacco warehouses could be regulated by the
13
state under the theory that it was affected with the public interest,
14
but that it has lost the "greater part, if not all, of its mystical power."
Following the trend established by the Nebbia case, the Supreme
Court, in Olsen v. Nebraska,1' reversed a former decision handed down
in Ribnick v. McBride.16 In the Ribnick case, the validity of a state
statute regulating the prices charged by employment agencies was
questioned, and the Supreme Court declared that the regulation was
invalid as a violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. In the opinion of the court it was stated that the basis for testing
the constitutionality of the regulation was whether the business was
one which was "affected with a public interest." If such an interest
exists, regulation is proper, otherwise it is a violation of the 14th
Amendment. Here, the court said, the interest did not exist, and the
regulation was unconstitutional. Thirteen years later, and after the
Nebbia case had been decided, the same problem came before the
court again in the Olsen case. This time, following the line of the
Nebbia case, the court said that "the drift away from Ribnick v. McBride, has been so great that it can no longer be deemed a controlling
authority."1'7 After citing the Nebbia case and subsequent decisions,
the court went on to say:
These cases represent more than scattered examples of constitutionally
permissible price fixing schemes. They represent in large measure a
basic departure from the philosophy and approach of the majority in
the Ribnick case. The standard there employed, following that used
in Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 et seq., was that the
constitutional validity of price fixing legislation, at least in the absence
of a so-called emergency, was dependent on whether or not the business in question was 'affected with a public interest.' It was said to
2

1 RoTscAEEIn, HANDBOOK OF CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW 486 (1939).

13 Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).

14 Supra, note 12 at 487.
15 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
16 Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
17 See also Tyson and Bro. United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 71 L.Ed. 718 (1927); which invalidated a state's attempt to
regulate fees charged by ticket brokers on ground that such business was not
affected with a public interest.
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be so affected if it bad been 'devoted to the public use' and if in
effect an interest had been granted to the 'public in that use.' Ribnick v. McBride. That test, labelled by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in the Tyson case as 'little more than a fiction,' was discarded in
Nebbia v. New York.18

With these cases, it seems clear that the Supreme Court shifted
from the public interest theory to the police power theory as basis for
the price regulation of private businesses by the state.
The adoption of the police power theory by the Supreme Court,
raised the ever present problem of determining the extent to which the
police power may be used to regulate private business without violating the constitutional guarantee of due process. It appears that the
police power of the state has no definite boundaries, and the determination of what is a valid exercise of the power and what is a violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment still causes
difficulty to the courts.
Rottschaefer says:
The judicial problem of defining the scope of regulatory legislation
permissible within the limits of those constitutional provisions inevitably involves an evaluative process in which the courts are compelled to discover the values intended to be secured by those provisions and to determine whether the legislative policies are in accord
or in conflict therewith. This involves a degree of creative activity
varying directly with the breadth of the policy enunciated by the
constitutional provisions....
The reasonableness of such legislation, and of the classifications made in connection therewith, frequently depends on the factual
situation existing at the time of its enactment or enforcement, and
facts bearing thereon should be presented in evidence unless of such
character that courts can take judicial notice of them. 19

It therefore appears that the judicial problem of defining the limits
of police power regulation and legislation is, in the end, one of appraising the relative merits of individualism and other social values.
The Supreme Court in interpreting the due process clause has not
prescribed any definite criteria as to how far states may limit freedom
to set prices on behalf of the general welfare or public good, so the
problem is always one of choosing between alternative values that are
so indefinite that it inevitably involves the use of discretion by the
courts. In these cases, courts must determine whether the law is a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of
the public health, safety or welfare, or whether it is an unreasonable
and arbitrary use of that power and hence a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
18 Id. 313 U.S. at 245.

d9 Supra, note 12 at 453.
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At the present time, every state in the Union has some type of price
fixing statute, and the businesses that are covered by such statutes are
so widely diversified that it would be impossible to make the statement that any particular business can be regulated and another one
cannot be. One thing, though, that seems fairly clear, is that most of
the states base their price regulating statutes on the police power and
not on the idea that the business to be regulated must be affected with
a public interest. As long as the regulation is not harsh, unreasonable,
or arbitrary, under the police power, it will not be a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even in cases in which price fixing statutes are held unconstitutional, the courts generally seem to indicate that the state has the power
to regulate under the police power as long as the regulation is not
unreasonable, and as long as it is for the general welfare of the
people.2 0 Of course, the problem is, and always will be one of determining when a statute is reasonable. Since there is no clear standard for this set out in the Constitution or any place else, it has to be
left up to the courts to decide in each particular case whether the
statute in question is reasonable. In determining this the court will
have to take under consideration several different factors. They will
always have to keep in mind the due process clause of the Constitution
and balance it against the social interests of the people. If the business
that is sought to be regulated is one which clearly affects the general
public, the solution is not difficult; but where, for instance, the prices
charged by barbers are sought to be regulated, it may become very
difficult to decide whether the general welfare of the people requires
21
such regulation.
In cases where the regulation of barber shops has been attempted,
the courts which have refused to uphold such regulation seem to base
such refusal solely on the broad fact that regulation of prices charged
will not have enough bearing on the general welfare of the people of
the state to warrant the interference of the state under the police
power.-- On the other hand, courts upholding such regulation state
that the general welfare of the people is elastic enough to include
20
Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450, 242 P. 2d 797 (1952).
21 Cases which rejected price control: State Board of Barber Examiners v.
Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E. 2d 972 (1942); State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178,
124 S.W. 2d 253 (1939);

Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz.

108, 231 P. 2d 450 (1951).

Cases upholding price control: Board of Barber

Examiners of Louisiana v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1939); Vandervort

v. Keen, 184 Okl. 121, 85 P. 2d 405 (1938); Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners,
45 N.M. 57, 109 P. 2d 779 (1941).
22 State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E. 2d 972
(1942); State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W. 253 (1939); Edwards v. State
Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P. 2d 450 (1951).
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regulation of prices charged by barber shops.2 3 Following this latter
line it was said in an Oklahoma case decided in 1938:
The limitations of the police power are plastic in their nature and
will expand to meet the actual requirements of an advancing civilizacomtion and adjust themselves to the necessities of our multiplying
24
plexities in moral, sanitary, economic and social conditions.

The courts have held many different businesses subject to price
regulation and it seems that the tendency is toward an elastic police
power to include more different types of businesses. In an Oklahoma
case, 25 the price charged for natural gas at the well was regulated and
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power; in a Florida case,20 a
statute regulating the prices paid by canning companies to citrus fruit
growers was questioned and upheld under the police power of the
state; and in a Louisiana case,2 7 it was held that the 14th Amendment
does not operate as a limitation on the state police power, but must
of necessity yield to the valid exercise of the police power. So, it would
seem clear that the test is now, not whether a business is affected with
a public interest, but whether the statute in question is one that can
be classified as a valid exercise of the state's police power.
There are few modem cases now in which it was held that the test
of whether a business may be regulated is whether it is clothed with
a public interest, but occasionally, one will still appear. In Georgia in
1937, the case of Townsend v. Yeomans,28 upheld a Georgia statute fixing the prices charged by tobacco warehouses on the ground that the
tobacco industry was so vitally connected with the public interest in
Georgia that the state had the authority to regulate it in the interest
of the public. This opinion though, did hint that the police power of
the state might possibly be the proper basis of the decision. Today,
courts that still base their decisions on price fixing on public interest
are definitely in the minority.
It seems to the writer that the more appropriate and most logical
approach to the problem of whether the state has power to regulate
the prices charged by private businesses to regard the regulation as an
exercise of police power. By basing regulation on the police power of
23

Board of Barber Examiners of Louisiana v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So.

485 (1938); Vandervort v. Keen, 184 Old. 121, 85 P. 2d 405 (1938); Arnold v.
Board24of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57 P. 2d 779 (1941).

(1938).
25
26
27

Syllabus of the Court, Vandervort v. Keen, 184 Old. 121, 85 P. 2d 405
Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).

Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940).

Board of Barber Examiners of Louisiana v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So.

485 (1938).
28

Supra, note 13.
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the state, there would be no need of the theory of public utility.
It has never been questioned that public utilities can be regulated
under the police power and to that extent it seems senseless to have
two bases for the power of the state when one would cover the territory previously covered by both. In the present day so many different
businesses are being regulated that it would be impossible to fit all of
them under the public utility theory. But by using the police power
theory, it is properly possible to bring almost any type business under
the police power of the state and within the realm of price fixing by
use of the indefinite term, general welfare. Still, the courts could guard
against any abuse of this power by determining that in a particular
case the legislation was so unreasonable as to violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ROBERT G. TnRvmr
LL.B., Kentucky, 1956.

